Does poaching distort training? by Moen, Espen R. & Rosén, Åsa





DOES POACHING DISTORT TRAINING?
by
Espen R. Moen and Åsa RosénDoes poaching distort training?∗
Espen R Moen†and Asa Rosen‡
June 28, 2002
Abstract
We analyse the eﬃciency of the labour market outcome in a competi-
tive search equilibrium model with endogenous turnover and endogenous
general human capital formation. We show that search frictions do not
distort training decisions if ﬁrms and their employees are able to coordi-
nate eﬃciently, for instance, by using long-term contracts. In the absence
of eﬃcient coordination devices there is too much turnover and too little
investments in general training. Nonetheless, the number of training ﬁrms
and the amount of training provided are constrained optimal, and training
subsidies therefore reduce welfare.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The positive relationship between wages and experience is well documented in the
empirical labour literature. This stylised fact indicates that on-the-job training
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1is one essential determinant of worker productivity. Accordingly, the extent to
which the market induces ﬁrms to invest in general and speciﬁc training is crucial
for economic welfare. In addition, turnover is important for allocational eﬃciency,
to ensure that workers are optimally allocated to ﬁrms at any given time. It is well
known from Becker (1964) that perfect competition leads to an eﬃcient market
outcome with respect to investment in training and turnover, provided that there
are no credit constraints or minimum wages regulations.
This paper analyses the conditions under which the labour market outcome
is eﬃcient in a model with endogenous human capital formation and endogenous
turnover in the presence of search frictions. To this end, we develop a directed
search model in which turnover is necessary to obtain an eﬃcient allocation of
workers. More precisely, there exists two types of ﬁrms; training ﬁrms which have
a comparative advantage in providing general training, and poaching ﬁrms which
have a comparative advantage in utilising general human capital. Workers with
diﬀerent productivities are assumed to search in diﬀerent submarkets. Within
this setting we analyse whether training ﬁrms have the right incentives to enter
the market and to provide the optimal amount of general training. In contrast
to the existing literature, we treat both the worker’s on-the-job search intensity
and the number of poaching ﬁr m sa se n d o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e s .
Our ﬁr s tm a i nr e s u l ti st h a ti n t e r n a le ﬃciency is a suﬃcient condition for an
eﬃcient resource allocation in this economy, both with respect to the allocation of
workers to ﬁrms and with respect to the investments in general training. Internal
eﬃciency refers to the resolution of co-ordination problems within each ﬁrm such
that employer and his employees maximise their joint expected income. Internal
eﬃciency may come about if workers and ﬁrms are able to write long-term binding
contracts, or if they are able to bargain eﬃciently.
This eﬃciency result contrasts sharply with Acemoglu (1997). He ﬁnds that
turnover in the presence of search frictions creates positive training externalities
for future employers. As a result, there is underinvestment in general training
even though ﬁrms and workers can write long-term contracts. He attributes the
ineﬃcient outcome to the workers’ inability to contract with future employers. As
we argue below, Acemoglu’s result hinges (among other things) on his assumption
that workers with diﬀerent productivities search in the same search market. As
a result, low-productivity workers create congestion eﬀects for high-productivity
workers, thereby reducing the return from training investments.
Our eﬃciency result also serves as a convenient benchmark when introducing
imperfections other than search frictions and clariﬁes why such imperfections may
give rise to ineﬃciencies. We focus on the case where internal eﬃciency does not
hold because training ﬁrms set wages for experienced workers so as to maximise
their ex post proﬁt. In this case, wages for experienced workers in training ﬁrms
are too low, the equilibrium turnover rate is too high, and investment in general
training tends to be too low compared with the socially optimal level.
Our second main result is that this amount of human capital formation is
2still constrained eﬃcient. Given the search behaviour of workers and the entry
behaviour of poaching ﬁrms, the social and the private returns from general train-
ing coincide. Thus, subsidising general training reduces welfare. More complex
policy measures may, however, increase welfare.
This second result also contrasts with the existing literature. Stevens (1994)
argues that poaching creates a wedge between the social and the private returns
from general training, as long as wages are set below worker productivity. For
similar reasons, Booth and Snower (1995, page 345) propose that market fail-
ures caused by poaching should be mitigated by subsidising general training, for
instance by letting the government pay a ﬁxed proportion of the ﬁrms’ training
expenditures. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a) are also sympathetic to training
subsidies. Moreover, this view inﬂuences the policy debate. For instance, the
O E C D( 1 9 9 5 ,C h a p t e r7 )a r g u e st h a tp o a c h ing externalities lead to underinvest-
ment in general training, thereby providing a rationale for government subsidies,
such as tax breaks for training expenses. Another example is the Swedish parlia-
mentary investigation on individual human capital formation (Sveriges Riksdag,
Direktiv 1999:106) which explicitly refers to the poaching externality as a rational
for subsidising investments in general training. Our paper questions this widely
held policy recommendation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
analyses the equilibrium outcome with internal eﬃciency. Section 4 examines the
case when wages for experienced workers are set so as to maximise ex post proﬁts.
Section 5 discusses robustness issues, and section 6 concludes. Mathematical
proofs are provided in the appendix.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section we describe the basic structure of the model and discuss the wage
formation in some detail. The model is set in continuous time. Workers enter
the labour market as unemployed and leave at an exogenous rate s. New workers
enter the market at the same rate, keeping the total measure of workers constant.
There are two types of ﬁrms in the economy, training ﬁrms and poaching
ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm hires at most one worker. Since only training ﬁrms invest in
general training all workers start their career in a training ﬁrm. A worker that
is hired by a training ﬁrm stays inexperienced for a period until he eventually
becomes experienced. Within a continuous-time framework the natural way to
model a period of time is to let the period length be stochastic: an inexperienced
worker (a novice) employed in a training ﬁrm becomes experienced at a rate γ.
The investment is made when the worker is a novice, and the return accrues once
the worker is experienced. The structure of the model is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
The productivity of a novice is yn. The productivity of an experienced worker
3with human capital level h in a training ﬁrm is ye a n di nap o a c h i n gﬁrm yp.
We assume that yn <y e <y p for all h ≥ 0. Hence, a poaching ﬁrm can utilise
experienced workers better than training ﬁrms. The main implication of this
assumption is that turnover is necessary for an eﬃcient allocation of workers.1
If instead ye = yp were to hold, turnover had no social value. This, however,
would not invalidate our eﬃciency results (see section 5 for details). The costs of
creating a training vacancy and a poaching vacancy are Kt and Kp, respectively.
There are two distinct search markets in the model, one for employed work-
ers and one for unemployed workers. In both markets, the number of matches
between searching workers and ﬁrms is determined by a constant return to scale
matching function x(eu,v). This matching function maps a measure of workers
u w h os e a r c hw i t ha na v e r a g ei n t e n s i t ye for a measure of v vacancies into a ﬂow
x of new matches. Let p denote the probability rate that a worker ﬁnds a (new)
job per unit of search intensity and q denote the probability rate that a ﬁrm with
a vacancy ﬁnds a worker. The arrival rates p and q are interrelated, as both
depend on the labour market tightness v/eu. Due to constant returns to scale,
the matching function can be summarised as q = q(p).2 The equilibrium values
of q and p are derived in the next sub-sections.
2.1 Asset values
Let Wu and Wn denote the expected discounted income, or ”asset value” of an
unemployed and of an inexperienced worker (novice), respectively. The asset








Here r denotes the discount rate, and c(eu)i st h es e a r c he ﬀo r tc o s to ft h ew o r k e r .
The latter is increasing, convex and c(0) = c0(0) = 0. We normalise the value of
leisure to zero. The asset value of a novice is given by
(r + s)W
n = w
n − µah + γ(W
e − W
n), (1)
where wn i st h ew a g eo fan o v i c e ,µ is the share of the training costs that is
paid by the worker, ah is the ﬂow training cost, and We is the asset value of an
experienced worker in a training ﬁrm with human capital level (training level)










1This assumption is stronger than necessary.. It is suﬃcient that some workers are more
eﬃcient in poaching ﬁr m st h a ni nt r a i n i n gﬁrms, and that these are the workers engaged in
on-the-job search.
2The probability rates p and q can be written as p = x(eu,v)/eu = x(1,θ)=e p(θ)a n d
q = x(eu,v)/v = x(1/θ,1) = ˜ q(θ), where θ = v/eu is the labour market tightness. The
matching technology can thus be summarised by a function q =˜ q(θ)=˜ q(e p−1(p)) = q(p).
4where we is the wage of an experienced worker with human capital h in a training
ﬁrm, pe the probability rate that an experienced worker with human capital h
ﬁn d saj o bi nap o a c h i n gﬁrm per unit of search intensity ee,a n dWp the expected
income to the worker in a poaching ﬁrm. The expected income in a poaching




where wp i st h ew a g ei nap o a c h i n gﬁrm for a worker with human capital level h.
Turning to the asset value equations of ﬁrms, Ji , i ∈ {n,e,p} denotes the
expected discounted lifetime of a ﬁrm with an employee. A ﬁrm that is abandoned


















Subsequently, we focus on the joint expected discounted income of a worker-ﬁrm
pair. Denote the joint expected income of a ﬁrm and its employee by Y i ≡ Wi+Ji,
i ∈ {n,e,p}.T h ej o i n ta s s e tv a l u e sa r e
(r + s)Y
n = y














Finally, the asset value equations for training vacancies (V n) and poaching va-













2.2 Competitive search equilibrium
Competitive search equilibrium combines competitive price determination and
search frictions and is thus a useful benchmark when analysing the impact of
search frictions. As workers are assumed to know the wages in all ﬁrms prior to
searching, the frictions are due to other aspects of the search process than col-
lecting information on wages. Examples are the costs and time delays associated
with writing and processing applications, with identifying ﬁrms with vacancies,
or with testing applicants.
5A core element of the competitive search equilibrium concept is the unique
relationship between the advertised wage and the expected rate at which the va-
cancy is ﬁlled. The relationship can be derived in several settings.3 Moen (1997)
considers an economy in which a market maker creates submarkets, each charac-
terised by a single wage. Workers and ﬁrms are free to choose which submarket
to enter. As shown by Moen, wage advertisements by ﬁrms, or reputation about
their wages, is suﬃcient to ensure that the same equilibrium wage prevails. In
this paper we follow this wage advertisement approach. Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999, section 4.1) give a similar interpretation to the one of the market maker,
by assuming that a ”middle man” (like a job centre) sets the wage. In Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999 a) and b)) the labour market is divided into regional or indus-
trial submarkets oﬀering potentially diﬀerent wages. Alternatively, the matching
technology may be derived from the urn-ball process (Montgomery (1991), Peters
(1991), and Burdett et al. (2001)).
In our model, searching workers are heterogeneous along (potentially) several
dimensions: they may be experienced or inexperienced, and experienced workers
may diﬀer with respect to the level of human capital investments (although in
equilibrium, all experienced workers choose the same level of training). Workers
with diﬀerent characteristics search, by assumption, in diﬀerent submarkets. The
number of matches in each submarket depends only on the number of workers
and ﬁrms in that submarket. Separation into submarkets may be due to the pro-
duction technology, say because a worker’s training level determines what kind
of tasks he can do (and will do in his next job). If training increases productivity,
without aﬀecting the range of job tasks that the worker can perform, the pro-
duction technology by itself does not create separation. Still, ﬁrms may separate
workers into diﬀerent submarkets by advertising the required human capital level
for their position (in addition to wages), thus mimicing a market maker that
separates workers with diﬀerent productivity into diﬀerent submarkets.
Inderst (2000) shows that it is indeed optimal for a market maker to separate
agents with diﬀerent characteristics into diﬀerent submarkets. The point is that
the optimal labour market tightness (ratio of vacancies to workers) increases with
worker productivity. Loosely speaking, letting a low-productivity worker into a
search market for high-productivity workers implies that too much resources are
spent in order to provide him with a job. The issue of separate search markets is
discussed further in section 5.
Technical deﬁnition of competitive search equilibrium
We derive the competitive search equilibrium for the on-the-job search market.
Analogous results can be derived for the unemployed search market (Moen and
Ros´ en (2001)). For the moment the inﬂow of workers into the on-the-job search
market, their human capital level h, and their wage during search are treated
3In this paragraph we borrow some arguments from Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b).
6as exogenous. Although these variables are endogenous in the model, they are
predetermined at the time at which on-the-job search takes place. Furthermore,
we assume that a worker’s on-the-job search is non-contractible, hence the wage
during search cannot be made contingent on the worker’s search behaviour.
From equations (2) and (8) it follows that we can write the asset value of an
experienced worker as We = We(Wp,p e,e e;h), and the asset value of a poaching
ﬁrm as V p = e V p(Wp,q(pe);h)=V p(Wp,p e;h). Below, we surpress the depen-
dence on h. The equilibrium in this search market is a vector (Wp∗,p e∗,e e∗)t h a t
satisﬁes the three following conditions.
1. Optimal search eﬀort
e

























The proﬁt maximisation condition can be given the following interpretation:
All submarkets (or ﬁrms) that attract workers must oﬀer these workers their
equilibrium expected income We∗. There typically is only one wage advertised in
equilibrium (see below). Nonetheless, when setting the wage, ﬁrms expect that
the arrival rate of workers to their ﬁrm b qe for out-of equilibrium wage oﬀers will







Firms choose Wp so as to maximise proﬁts given these expectations. This yields
the proﬁt maximisation condition. Note that the expectations are rational in the
following sense. Suppose that a small set of ﬁrms deviates and advertises an out-
of equilibrium wage W0. Applications would then ﬂow to these ﬁrms up to the
point at which the applicants obtain exactly their equilibrium expected income
We∗,i nw h i c hc a s eqe(W0)=b qe(W0) holds (see Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and
Shimer (1999a) for details).
The free entry condition and equation (8) imply that Wp = Y p −
r+qe
qe Kp.













The competitive search equilibrium allocation is such that V p is maximised given
We, while free entry ensures that V p = Kp. It is straightforward to show that
in equilibrium We is maximised given that V p = Kp.T ob em o r ep r e c i s e ,d e ﬁne
the feasible set of pairs (Wp,p e)a sΦp = {(Wp,p e)|V p(Wp,p e) ≥ Kp}.
7Lemma 1 In the competitive search equilibrium, We(Wp,p e,e e) is maximised
given that (Wp,p e) ∈ Φp.4
Moen (1997) shows that the model may have multiple equilibria which all
yield the same value of We. To avoid uninteresting technicalities, we assume
that the equilibrium is unique. It follows that the competitive search equilibrium










where Φp depends on h, i.e., Φp = Φp(h). An equivalent result holds for the
unemployed search market (Moen and Ros´ en (2001)).
R o l eo ft h ew a g ed u r i n gs e a r c h
In this section we examine the eﬀe c tt h a tc h a n g e si nwe in an individual ﬁrm
have on the search behaviour of its employee. In what follows we argue as if the
training ﬁrms set the wage for experienced workers.
The competitive search equilibrium derived above depends on we,s i n c eWe
depends on we. As will become clear shortly, all workers are oﬀered the same
wage we∗ in equilibrium, and consequently all poaching ﬁrms oﬀe rt h es a m ew a g e
wp∗. Still, the search behaviour of workers that receive out-of equilibrium wages
may be important. Consider a small set of training ﬁrms that deviates and
oﬀers the experienced worker a wage w0 6= we∗.T h i sa ﬀects their workers’ search
behaviour, that is, both the search intensity ee and the trade-oﬀ between Wp
and pe. The associated competitive search equilibrium in this new submarket,







0)g i v e n t h a t ( W
p,p
e) ∈ Φ
p,( 1 0 )
where w0 is included as an argument to highlight the dependence of We on the
wage during search.
In what follows, we assume that ﬁrms (and workers), when considering a wage
w0 6= we∗ form expectations about the resulting arrival rate of job oﬀers and about
the search intensity of the worker that are consistent with (10). The expectations
are rational in the sense that if a small set of ﬁrms deviates and oﬀer this wage,
the expectations are fulﬁlled.5
4A similar result is derived in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a).
5An alternative way to rationalise this assumption is to assume that some ﬁrms ”tremble”
and oﬀer wages other than the equilibrium training wage. Non-empty submarkets for other
training wages than the equilibrium wage then exist. The competitive search equilibrium can
be deﬁned as the limit obtained when the measure of deviating ﬁrms converges to zero (Moen
(1994)).
8Eﬃciency
We now derive the welfare properties of the equilibrium allocation in the on-
the-job search market under the following assumptions and discuss later under
which conditions these assumptions indeed hold.
Assumption 1: The experienced worker’s income ﬂow while searching is equal
to his marginal productivity, i.e., we = ye.
Assumption 2: The social and the private value of a match coincide.
We say that a search market is eﬃcient if the net value created in the search
market is maximised, for a given inﬂow of workers. This value is equal to the
product of the number of matches times the value of each match less the cost of
vacancy creation. The number of matches in the market is given by eepeNe,a n d
the value of each match is Y p. In steady state, the value creation in the market
is thus eepeNeY p− eepeNeKp. Furthermore, as it takes time before vacancies are
ﬁlled, the cost of having a stock vp of vacancies is vpKpr. Total hiring costs can
thus be written as eepeNe r+qe





















The social planner maximises this function with respect to pe and ee, subject to
the constraint
˙ N




where b i st h e( f o rn o w )e x o g e n o u si n ﬂow of workers to the search market.6
Lemma 2 Given assumptions 1 and 2, the following holds:
a) The socially optimal allocation maximises We given that (Wp,p e) ∈ Φp.
b) The social value of an additional worker entering the search market is equal
to his equilibrium expected income We.
c) Property b) still holds when the number of ﬁrms in the market is exogenous.
Together with Lemma 1, part a) immediately implies that the competitive
search equilibrium outcome is optimal. Part b) implies that the private gain
from entering the search market coincides with the social value. Part c) says that
this property does not hinge on entry by poaching ﬁrms. With Assumptions1
and 2 adjusted accordingly equivalent results (part a and b) hold also for the
unemployed search market (Moen and Ros´ en (2001))
6Result a) is stated and proved in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b)
93I n t e r n a l e ﬃciency
In this section, we deﬁne internal eﬃciency and then derive and evaluate the
equilibrium of the model, provided that internal eﬃciency holds. We also show
how internal eﬃciency can be implemented through various contractual arrange-
ments. Finally, we discuss whether the ﬁrm has an incentive to pay for the
worker’s general training.
In a training ﬁrm, the choice of the training level h and the worker’s on-the-job
search behaviour inﬂuence their joint income Y n. We refer to a training ﬁrm as
internally eﬃcient if its co-ordination problems are resolved, such that the joint
expected income Y n is maximized. Internal eﬃciency requires that the following
two conditions are satisﬁed:
1. Internal eﬃciency ex post: The on-the-job search behaviour that maximises
We also maximises Y e.
2. Internal eﬃciency ex ante: The training level is set so as to maximise Y n.
One way to implement internal eﬃciency ex post is to set the wage of an
experienced worker equal to his productivity in which case Y e ≡ We holds. Since
the on-the-job search behaviour that maximizes Y e also maximizes Y n, it follows
directly that internal eﬃciency holds if and only if there is internal eﬃciency ex
post and ex ante.
3.1 Equilibrium with internal eﬃciency
A worker enters a search market twice during his career, once as an unemployed
worker searching for his ﬁr s tj o ba n do n c ea sa ne x p e r i e n c e dw o r k e rs e a r c h i n gf o ra
j o bi nap o a c h i n gﬁrm. Clearly, these markets are interrelated. The opportunities
for an experienced worker in the on-the-job search market inﬂuences his expected
i n c o m ew h e na p p l y i n gf o rj o b sa sa nu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e ra sw e l la sh i sr e t u r n
from human capital investment. Furthermore, the prospect that workers may
quit aﬀects the incentives of a ﬁrm to enter the market as a training ﬁrm.
The model is solved backwards. We have already analysed the equilibrium in
the on-the-job search market, for a given level of human capital h.P o a c h i n gﬁrms
advertise wages and required human capital level. For a given h, the equilibrium










Hence, we can write the equilibrium value of Y e as Y e = b Y e(h).
We now turn to the human capital investment decision. Given Y e,t h ev a l u e
of Y n is determined by (4). Ex ante internal eﬃciency thus requires that h max-
imises Y n. As will become clear soon, only one investment level is chosen in
10equilibrium. Nonetheless, when considering alternative values of h,t h ew o r k e r -
ﬁrm pair expects that the associated expected incomes when the worker becomes
experienced are given by Y e = b Y e(h)a n dc h o o s e sh so as to maximise Y n given
these expectations. These expectation formations are analogous to the expec-
tation formations by ﬁrms considering out-of-equilibrium wages. Two further
comments regarding these expectations formations are warranted.
First, as hazard rate expectations, these expectations are rational in the fol-
lowing sense: Suppose a small set of agents deviates and chooses an out-of equilib-
rium value h0. As a result, a new submarket would open up for these workers, and
the workers would obtain an expected income equal to b Y e(h). Second, if workers
were heterogenous, the problems of ”empty submarkets” could be avoided. In
an earlier version of this paper (Moen and Ros´ en (2001)) we derive the equi-
librium when the investment cost a has a discrete distribution and the training
levels are discrete. In this case, all possible training levels are actually chosen
in equilibrium. The equilibrium in this paper can be derived as the limit when
the distribution of training costs converges to a mass point (without reducing the
support) and when the diﬀerence between two adjacent investment levels becomes
arbitrarily small.
The equilibrium value of h, h∗,t h u ss o l v e st h ep r o b l e m
max
h Y
n(h)g i v e n t h a t Y
e = b Y
e(h).
In the unemployed-search market, ﬁrms advertise wage contracts, which may
include provided training level and wages for experienced workers. The exact
form of the advertised contract is discussed below. From the workers’ point of
view, the attractiveness of a wage contract is measured by the associated value of
Wn (the expected lifetime income when becoming employed). As in the on-the-












where Φt = {(Wn,p u)|V n(Wn,p u;h∗) ≥ Kt} and where V n is deﬁned by equa-
tion (7). In the appendix we prove the existence of the equilibrium under the
conditions that yp − ye > (r + s)Kp and
(r+s)(yn−ah∗)+γye(h∗)
r+s+γ > (r + s)Kt.W e
assume that the equilibrium is unique.
We now turn to the welfare properties of this equilibrium. Solving the social
planner’s maximisation problem in full is rather complex, and is therefore deferred
to the appendix. Here we give a heuristic explanation and the intuition for the
results.
Consider ﬁrst an on-the-job search market in which the workers’ human capital
level is h.F o r a n y i n ﬂow rate of workers into this market, the social planner
maximises net value creation given by (11). From Lemma 2 we know that the
11competitive search equilibrium allocation solves this problem for all h.F r o mt h e
same Lemma we also know that
dR(Ne)
dNe = Y e. Thus, the social and the private
value of an additional experienced worker with this training level coincide.
Now consider the training level h. When the worker-ﬁrm pairs decide on h,
they do so on the basis of their expectations b Y e(h), which equal the social value of
investing this amount. Since the relationship between Y e and Y n is mechanical
(for a given h), the social and (perceived) private value of Y n(h) coincides, for all
h. Accordingly, the planner solves the same maximisation problem as the agents
in the market when choosing training level. This implies that maxY n(h)r e ﬂects
both the social and the private value of a match between an unemployed worker
and a training ﬁrm. But then we know from Lemmata 1 and 2 (part a) that the
unemployed-search market is eﬃcient as well.
Proposition 1 Given internal eﬃciency holds, the labour market equilibrium
outcome is eﬃcient. In particular,
a) The level of general human capital investments is socially optimal.
b) The numbers of training ﬁrms and of poaching ﬁrms entering the market
are socially optimal.
c) When the number of poaching ﬁrms is exogenous the equilibrium allocation
is still eﬃcient in the sense that aggregate output is maximised given the number
of poaching ﬁrms.
To gain intuition, suppose ex post eﬃciency is obtained by paying experienced
workers in training ﬁrms a wage equal to their productivity (see the next subsec-
tion for details). In this case, the workers’ search behaviour has no externality
on their employers. Since experienced workers do not generate any proﬁts for
training ﬁrms, these ﬁrms do not care whether their experienced workers stay or
leave.
The entry decision of a ﬁrm with a vacancy gives rise to search externali-
ties, a positive externality for workers and a negative externality for other ﬁrms
with vacancies. In the competitive search equilibrium, these externalities oﬀset
each other (as the Hosios condition is met), and therefore an optimal number of
v a c a n c i e se x i s t si nt h em a r k e t .
F o rag i v e nn u m b e ro fp o a c h i n gﬁr m st h es a m ea r g u m e n th o l d sf o rw o r k e r s .A
worker that enters the on-the-job search market creates a negative externality for
other workers and a positive externality for poaching ﬁrms. In the competitive
search equilibrium, these two externalities exactly cancels out, and the social and
private value of entering the market coincide. This is true in the search markets
associated with all possible values of h (although only one of them is active in
equilibrium). Thus the training choice of worker-ﬁrm pairs has no net search
externalities on other agents. As training is determined so as to maximise joint
surplus, the training decision is socially optimal. Furthermore, by Lemma 2 the
social and the private value of a worker-training ﬁrm match coincide. But then
we know that the unemployed search market is eﬃcient as well.
12With free entry of poaching ﬁrms, the number of workers entering the on-
the-job search market, or their level of training, have no externalities for other
workers or for poaching ﬁrms, as pe is independent of the measure of workers in
the submarket.
3.2 Implementing internal eﬃciency
In this subsection, we explore various arrangements that lead to internal eﬃciency
and hence to an optimal amount of training.
Firms advertise long-term wage contracts
Suppose ﬁrms are able to advertise and commit to long-term contracts. Several
types of wage contracts may then ensure internal eﬃciency.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that it is in the ﬁrms’ interest to advertise and
commit to internally eﬃcient arrangements. Consider a set of contracts that
g i v e st h ew o r k e r sa ne x p e c t e di n c o m eWn, arbitrarily chosen. The ﬁrm has then
an incentive to oﬀer the contract that maximises Y n − Wn, i.e., to choose the
contract that leads to internal eﬃciency.
One set of contracts that ensure internal eﬃciency is a long-term contingent
contract (wn,w e(h)) such that the wage when the worker is experienced equals
his productivity, we(h)=ye(h). As such a wage schedule makes the worker
residual claimant on the return from human capital, the eﬃcient investment is
undertaken if the worker bears the entire investment cost. The wage wn is set so
as to scale the worker’s total compensation. Trivially, the same outcome can be
implemented by having only two levels for we, a low level if investment is below
h∗, and a wage equal to ye(h∗)i fi n v e s t m e n ti sa to ra b o v eh∗,w h e r eh∗ is the
optimal training level.
If wage contracts in which we is contingent on h are diﬃcult to enforce, internal
eﬃciency can be obtained by a non-contingent wage contract we = ye(h∗). In
order to achieve internal eﬃciency, h∗ could then be advertised. Alternatively,
the ﬁrm can advertise a share µ of the investment costs that the worker has to
bear. For a given we,t h e ﬁrm receives the increase in ye associated with a
higher h, while the worker gains by increasing his prospects in the on-the-job









.( 1 2 )
Thus, if the worker and the ﬁrm ﬁnance shares µ and (1 − µ) of the costs, the
ﬁrst best investment level is reached. Again, wn should be adjusted to scale the
worker’s total compensation.
13Firms sell oﬀ jobs
The simplest way to obtain internal eﬃciency is to let the ﬁrms advertise a ”price”
P that the worker has to pay in order to become residual claimant. The expected
income to the worker is then Wn = Y n − P. As a residual claimant, the worker
is induced to behave in an internally eﬃcient manner. Analogously to before, a
ﬁrm trades oﬀ ah i g hp r i c eP against a low arrival rate of workers.
Quitting fees
Alternatively, the ﬁrm can uses quitting fees to ensure optimal on-the-job search
behaviour. Suppose the wage to an experienced worker we is less than his pro-
ductivity ye. In the absence of quitting fees, the worker engages in too much
on-the-job search, thereby reducing joint expected income. It is straightforward
to show that the worker can be induced to adopt the optimal on-the-job search
behaviour (both in terms of search eﬀort and the correct trade-oﬀ between wages
and job ﬁnding rates) if he pays a fee F =( ye − we)/(r + s) when quitting.
With quitting fees and wages below marginal product, a worker is not residual
claimant on the return from the human capital investment. Eﬃcient investments
may be achieved either if ﬁrms and workers bargain (see below), or if ﬁrms ad-
vertise training level h∗,o ri ft h eﬁrm contributes to the investment costs as
described above.
Eﬃcient bargaining
Given symmetric information between the worker and the employee, standard
Nash bargaining leads under quite general assumption to an internally eﬃcient
outcome. As long as the eﬃcient outcome is in the opportunity set and utility
(income) is transferable, internal eﬃciency prevails.
Let us give an example. Suppose that the ﬁrm advertises an unconditional
wage w only, and that the worker and the ﬁrm bargain over the wage contract and
the training level. For simplicity the ﬁrm is assumed to have all the bargaining
power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the worker. The worker accepts
any arrangement which gives him a payoﬀ g r e a t e rt h a no re q u a lt ot h ep a y o ﬀ
that he receives with the initial contract. Denote this payoﬀ by Wn(w,0). The
payoﬀ to the ﬁrm is then Y n(h)−Wn(w,0). Being the residual claimant, the ﬁrm
chooses an arrangement that maximises Y n.T h u s ,i ft h eﬁrm has the contractual
instruments available to propose an internally eﬃcient contract it does so, and
adjust wn so as to scale total compensation. This may be a wage contract of the
form (wn,w e), where we is set equal to the productivity of the worker when he
is experienced, or a contract with quitting fees that ensures optimal on-the-job
search behaviour.
Internal eﬃciency also emerges when both the worker and the ﬁrm have some
bargaining power, provided that there is bargaining over both wages and human
14capital investment. Eﬃciency in the unemployed search market obtains if the ﬁrm
can manipulate the worker’s total compensation through its advertised contract
(w,h).
Finally, suppose wages are renegotiated once the worker is experienced. Eﬃ-
cient on-the-job search behaviour can still be implemented as long as we allow for
quitting fees hence ex post eﬃciency obtains. Knowing this, eﬃcient bargaining
over h is enough to ensure ex ante eﬃciency, and thus internal eﬃciency.
3.3 Who pays for training?
From Becker (1964) we know that when the labour market is perfectly competi-
tive, workers pay the full cost of general training. Several recent papers address
the issue of why and when ﬁrms have incentives to invest in general training.7
One ﬁnding is that when the wages increase less than productivity, e.g. due to
search frictions and wage determination by bargaining, ﬁrms have incentives to
invest in general training.
In our model with internal eﬃciency, the extent to which ﬁrms pay for train-
ing depends on the contractual arrangementt h a ti su s e df o ro b t a i n i n gi n t e r n a l
eﬃciency. Workers pay the full cost if ﬁrms advertise long-term contract with
wages for experienced workers contingent on the amount of training that the
worker undertakes as a novice. Since the worker as a novice also provides a proﬁt
margin suﬃcient to capitalise the ﬁrm’s search costs, the wage for a novice may
be low.
The more interesting case is when ﬁrms advertise long-term contracts in which
the wage for experienced workers is not conditioned on h. Ultimately, the wage
(net of human capital investments) is the same as with conditional wage contracts.
At the margin, the ﬁrm ﬁnances, however, a share 1 − µ of the training, where
µ i sg i v e nb ye q u a t i o n( 1 2 ) .U s i n gt h a tY e(h)=We(h)+
ye(h)−we
r+s+eepe,t h a t∂We
∂ee =
∂We










Hence, if the search frictions are large (measured as a low optimal turnover rate
eepe for a given Y p), µ is small and approaches zero as the turnover rate goes to
zero. Thus, if the frictions are large, the ﬁrm ﬁnances the entire training cost
at the margin. By contrast, if the turnover rate is large, µ is large as well and
converges to 1 as turnover becomes immediate. The reason is that the longer
the worker stays in the ﬁrm, the larger is the share of the return on training
that accrues to the ﬁrm at the margin. This ﬁnding resembles the ﬁndings in
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) that ﬁrms pay a larger share of the training costs
7For a survey see Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a).
15when frictions are high. Though their mechanism diﬀers from the one in the
present paper. In Acemouglu and Pischke (1999b) all separations are exogenous,
and higher frictions are tantamount to a lower exit rate from unemployment. A
lower exit rate increases the share paid by the ﬁrm because it implies a more
distorted (compressed) wage-schedule. In our model, the driving force is not
through the degree of distortion in the wa g es c h e d u l eb u tt h ea c t u a le x p e c t e d
time the worker stays in the ﬁrm.
If wages for experienced workers are set below their productivity and inter-
nal eﬃciency is obtained by quitting fees, this may also induce ﬁrms to ﬁnance
training. The share of the training costs that is born by the ﬁrm depends on the
exact formulation of the bargaining game.
4 Ex post determination of wages
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw ea d d r e s st h ec o m m o nc o n c e r ni nt h el i t e r a t u r et h a tt h e r em a yb e
excessive turnover and too little investment in general training because wages are
for various reasons below the workers’ productivity (e.g., Stevens (1994), OECD
(1995, Chapter 7), and Booth and Chatterji (1998)).
4.1 Equilibrium with ex post wage setting
We modify our framework and assume that ﬁrms cannot commit ex ante to the
wage that they will pay a worker once he is experienced. Thus, training ﬁrms
set wages for experienced workers so as to maximise ex post proﬁt. We do not
allow for quitting fees. When setting the wage for an experienced worker, a ﬁrm
trades oﬀ a low wage bill against a high turnover rate.8 A high wage reduces
the turnover rate for two reasons. First, it implies that the worker applies for
jobs oﬀering high wages with long job queues, thereby reducing pe.S e c o n d ,t h e
worker reduces his on-the-job search eﬀort ee.

















e), given that (W
p,p
e) ∈ Φ
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where Φp is deﬁned as in section 2.2 and We(Wp,p e,e e;we) denotes the asset value
of a searching worker with income ﬂow we while searching, (see equation (10) and
8The trade-oﬀ between turnover and wage costs has been studied by several authors, (e.g.
Salop (1979), Stiglitz (1985), Burdett and Mortensen (1998)). Our paper diﬀers from these
papers in several respect, most notably, in our choice of a directed search model, and in our
focus on the eﬃciency of the level of general training provided by the market.
16the following discussion). We are not able to ﬁnd a closed form solution to this
problem, even when we parameterise the matching function. It is, however, clear
that the ﬁrm always sets we <y e.A twe = ye the ﬁrm earns zero proﬁt while it
obtains a strictly positive proﬁt for all we <y e. The maximisation problem given
by (13) deﬁnes the equilibrium in the on-the-job search market (Wp∗,p e∗,e e∗;we).
We assume that the worker-ﬁrm pairs are able to obtain internal eﬃciency ex
ante. Hence, the training level is set so as to maximise the joint income Y n(h),
taking into account that the wages of experienced workers are set as described
above.
Lemma 3 Compared to the equilibrium with internal eﬃciency, the following
holds in the equilibrium with ex post wage determination
1. For a given h:
(a) T o om a n yp o a c h i n gﬁrms enter the market relative to the number of
training ﬁrms (pe is higher).
(b) T h eo n - t h e - j o bs e a r c hi n t e n s i t yi sh i g h e r( ee is higher).
2. Fewer training ﬁrms enter the market.
While Y n(h)i sm a x i m i s e df o ra n yh with internal eﬃciency ex post this does
not hold when wages are set so as to maximise ex post proﬁt. Thus, Y n is lower
which implies that fewer training ﬁrms enter the market.
With respect to the amount of training in each ﬁrm, the impact of ex post
wage determination is by no means clear cut. The reason is that we have no
control over the relationship between we and h, it may even be discontinuous.
If a small increase in h leads to a large increase in we, investments in h may be
considered as a commitment device.B yi n c r e a s i n gh by a small amount the ﬁrm
may ﬁnd it in its own interest ex post to set a substantially higher wages, thereby
reducing the ineﬃciencies created by excessive turnover. We can therefore not
rule out that ex post wage determination actually increases the amount of training
undertaken compared to the ﬁrst best.
In order to derive more clear-cut results, further restrictions must be imposed
o nt h em o d e l . A sa ne x a m p l e ,a s s u m et h a tt h e r ea r eo n l yt w ol e v e l so fh u m a n
capital, zero and one and that only workers with human capital h = 1 engage
in on-the-job search. In this case, excessive turnover due to ex post wage setting
reduces Y e
h=1 but has no eﬀect on Y e
h=0, and the joint private return from investing
in human capital unambiguously falls. Furthermore, assume that the workers
diﬀer with respect to the cost of acquiring human capital, a, where each worker’s
a is independently drawn from a known distribution and the draw takes place
after the worker is hired but prior to the investment decision. Then there exists a
cut-oﬀ value a∗ such that all workers with a<a ∗ invest in training. This cut-oﬀ
level may then be compared with the corresponding socially optimal cut-oﬀ level.
The following result then obtains (proof omitted):
17Lemma 4 Given h ∈ {0,1}, ee
h=0 =0 ,a n dee
h=1 > 0 with internal eﬃciency, the
amount of training (the cut-oﬀ level of a) with ex post wage setting is lower than
the ﬁrst best level obtained with internal eﬃciency.
Similar results have often been used in the literature to rationalise training
subsidies.
4.2 Training subsidies
We begin the analysis of how training subsidies aﬀect the outcome by deﬁning
the constrained eﬃcient level of training.
Deﬁnition of Constrained Eﬃciency: Suppose the social planner determines
the number of training ﬁrms that enter the market and the level of training per
worker h, while the decisions of experienced workers, training ﬁrms, and poaching
ﬁrms are determined in the market according to (13). The level of training and
the number of training ﬁrms entering the market are then constrained eﬃcient if
the social planer chooses the same outcome as the one that prevails in the market.
We thus do a similar exercise as in Stevens (2001), where it is assumed that
the planner can overrule only the investment decision of ﬁrms.
In general, the training level with ex post wage setting diﬀers from the training
level with internal eﬃciency, and the number of training ﬁrms that enter is un-
ambiguously lower. As the next Proposition shows, the training level is, however,
still constrained eﬃcient.
Proposition 2 The training level and the number of poaching ﬁrms are con-
strained eﬃcient.
Since training levels are constrained eﬃcient, a training subsidy (if the training
level is too low), regulations of training, or subsidised entry of training ﬁrms do
not improve welfare.
The point is that although excessive turnover reduces the private returns from
training, it also reduces the social returns from training by the same amount.
Thus, the social and private gains from training coincide, and a training subsidy
or regulation of training levels is ineﬃcient.
Let us look at this point more closely. Suppose a small group of ﬁrms deviates
from the equilibrium value h0 and instead chooses a training level h00.W ew a n t
to look at the consequences for the other agents in the economy. Fewer poaching
ﬁrms will enter the submarket for h0-workers, and the equilibrium values of pe,
We,a n dee stay constant. Thus, workers in the h0 -submarket are not aﬀected,
and since pe and ee are unaﬀected, neither are training ﬁrms.
When the worker and the ﬁrm choose h they do that so as to maximise
their joint expected income Y n, taking into account that the worker engages in
18excessive on-the-job search once he is experienced. But since there are no net
externalities for other agents in the market, the level of h is constrained eﬃcient.
The entry decision by training ﬁrms is constrained eﬃcient since the unem-
ployed search market maximizes the unemployed workers’ welfare, given that
training ﬁrms break even and since there is no net externalities on other workers
or ﬁrms in the on-the-job search market.
As mentioned in the introduction, the literature tends to conclude that subsi-
dies or regulation is welfare improving if there is underinvestment due to turnover.
In fact, much of the literature only establishes circumstances for underinvestment
in general training and infers from this ﬁnding that subsidies/regulation (in the
absence of governmental failures) are welfare improving.
We want to compare our ﬁndings with those in Stevens (2001). In her model,
both the number of ﬁrms and the number of workers trained in each ﬁrm are
endogenously determined. Due to turnover, ﬁrms train too few workers and
the equilibrium is not constrained eﬃcient. Consequently, the government can
improve welfare by forcing ﬁrms to train more workers. Stevens’ model diﬀers
from ours in several respects. For instance, search frictions are not explicitly
modelled and there is no free entry of ﬁrms in the on-the-job search market. This
latter feature makes her model similar to our model with free entry of training
ﬁrms but with a ﬁxed number of poaching ﬁrms. With an exogenous number
of poaching ﬁrms, the equilibrium of our model may not be constrained eﬃcient
either. To see this, consider the above example with only two training levels h =0
and h =1a n dw i t hn oo n - t h e - j o bs e a r c hw h e nh =0 .I fﬁrms train more workers
(higher cut-oﬀ value a∗), the arrival rate pe for trained workers falls, which may
aﬀect the incentives to invest in training in the ﬁrst place.
In Stevens’ model, ﬁrst best (although achievable with direct regulation of
training) cannot be achieved by subsidies alone, because a training subsidy dis-
torts the entry decision of training ﬁrms. In order to reach eﬃciency, a tax on
ﬁrms has to be imposed. As will become clear below, we are also able to obtain
ﬁr s tb e s tb yam i xo ft a x e so np o a c h i n gﬁrms and training subsidies. The taxes
in our model play, however, a diﬀerent role than in Stevens’ model. In our model,
taxes are used to avoid excessive turnover, rather than to reduce the proﬁtability
of entering the market for training ﬁrms.
4.3 Combined policy measures
While a training subsidy or regulations of training alone cannot improve welfare,
they may do so if combined with policy measures aimed at reducing the turnover
rate, hereafter referred to as ex post policy measures. Also other policies, such
as taxes on poaching ﬁrms, may by themselves improve welfare. We therefore
analyse the eﬀects of other policy instruments, e.g., proﬁt and pay-roll taxes,
alone and in combination with training subsidies. This also sheds light on the ef-
fectiveness of former and present policy programs targeted at promoting training
19in ﬁrms. For instance, the Australian government imposed an pay-roll tax of 1%
for ﬁrms that provide insuﬃcient amount of training (OECD (1995), Chapter 7),
which corresponds to a pay-roll tax for poaching ﬁrms. In France and earlier also
in U.K, a pay-roll tax for all ﬁrms is coupled with a subsidy for training (Steven
(2001)).
Since the underinvestment in training is ultimately caused by the too low
wages for experienced workers in training ﬁrms, the most direct policy is to
enforce higher wages for these workers, say through collective wage agreements
or wage subsidies. As such radical measures, however, distort the economy along
other dimensions (not modelled here), we focus on measures aimed at changing
the behaviour of poaching ﬁrms.
The trade-oﬀ that training ﬁrms face when setting the ex post wage is rather
complex. This makes it extremely diﬃcult to characterise the impact of ex post
policy measures on wages in training ﬁrms. For instance, training ﬁrms may
respond to less entry of poaching ﬁrms by reducing or increasing the wages,
depending on the functional form of the matching function. In order to simplify
the discussion, we therefore ﬁrst assume that the wage for experienced workers is
constant and independent of any policy intervention. Furthermore, we initially
keep the amount of training in each training ﬁrm and the number of training
ﬁrms ﬁxed when analysing the eﬀects of taxes on poaching ﬁrms.
Taxes on poaching ﬁrms
Turnover is created by both on-the-job search of workers and by entry of
poaching ﬁrms, and more than one policy measure is needed to control both.
Below we consider three kinds of taxes on poaching ﬁrms; entry tax, proﬁtt a x ,
and pay-roll tax.
Entry tax
An entry tax T for poaching ﬁrms increases the entry cost from Kp to Kp +
T. Thus, free entry implies from equation (9) that Wp = Y p −
r+qe
qe (Kp + T).
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e). (14)
In the appendix we show that both pe and ee decrease with T and go to zero
as Kp + T approaches Y p. Under the assumption that pe and ee are continuous
functions of T, it is possible to choose T in such a way that either pe or ee is
equal to its ﬁrst best level. As shown in the appendix, the eﬀect of T on pe is
stronger than that on ee in the following sense: Setting the entry tax T such that
pe is reduced to its ﬁrst-best level pe∗, also reduces ee but keeps ee above its ﬁrst
best level ee∗. The intuition is that an entry tax on poaching ﬁrms increases the
cost of creating turnover through vacancies, while leaving the cost of creating
turnover through on-the-job search unaltered.
20Tax on proﬁt
In a regime with a proﬁtt a xf o rp o a c h i n gﬁrms, T = t(Y p − Wp), free entry
implies that Wp = Y p − t(Y p − Wp) −
r+qe


















This problem is equivalent to the problem given in (14) with T = t
1−tKp.T h u s ,
ap r o ﬁt tax is equivalent to an entry tax.
Pay-roll taxes
With pay-roll taxes, T = tWp, free entry implies that Wp = Y p − tW p −
r+qe
qe Kp. Thus, the competitive search equilibrium solves the problem (after mul-
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In the appendix we show that the pay-roll tax reduces both pe and ee. In contrast
to entry taxes, a pay-roll tax has a larger eﬀect on ee than on pe.A t a x r a t e
t0 that lowers ee to its optimal level ee∗, also reduces pe but leaves pe above its
optimal level pe∗.
Combination of pay-roll and entry taxes
Both pay-roll taxes and entry taxes reduce entry of poaching ﬁrms and the
search eﬀort of workers in training ﬁrms, though their relative impact on pe and
ee diﬀers. This leads us to believe that there exists a combination of a pay-roll
tax and an entry tax that implements the ﬁrst best values of pe and ee (for a
given h). In what follows we assume that this is indeed the case.
Training and entry subsidies to training ﬁrms
We now assume that pay-roll and entry taxes are set so as to induce ﬁrst best
levels of pe and ee, and analyse the training and entry decisions of training ﬁrms.
The reduction in turnover, created through taxes on poaching ﬁrms, has an
ambiguous eﬀect on the training level h even when wages are assumed to be
ﬁxed exogenously. For a given wage, lower turnover increases the return from
investment for the training ﬁrms, but reduces the return for the worker, and a
priori either eﬀect may dominate.
Furthermore, the constrained eﬃciency result derived above no longer holds,
as investments in training now gives rise to a tax externality. An increase in h
inﬂuences the number of poaching ﬁrms entering the market and the wage that
they oﬀer, and thus also the tax collected by the government. For a ﬁxed wage
21we,a ni n c r e a s ei nh increases both the number of poaching ﬁrms and the wage
wp,p r o v i d e dt h a typ increases proportionally at least as much as ye.I nt h i sc a s e ,
a training subsidy is warranted.
If we endogenise the ex post wage we, this may no longer hold. Since we cannot
determine how we responds to changes in h,w ec a n n o tr u l eo u tt h a ti n v e s t m e n t
in training reduces turnover at the margin. If this eﬀect dominates, there is a
negative tax externality from training, and the subsidy should be negative (a
tax).
How is the entry decision of training ﬁrms aﬀected? Consider the situation
where taxes on poaching ﬁrms and training subsidies are such that they imple-
ment ﬁrst best training levels and turnover rates. Taxes on poaching ﬁrms tend
to decrease the joint expected income Y n (as taxes decreases the value of turnover
to the worker), while a training subsidy (if positive) tends to increase Y n. Hence,
we cannot determine whether it is optimal to subsidise or to tax entry of training
ﬁrms.
As stated above, the training enhancing policy in Australia may be inter-
preted as a pay-roll tax on poaching ﬁrms. It is clear that such a policy alone
does not implement the ﬁrst best solution. With policy invariant wages such a
policy, however, tends to reduce turnover, which ceteris paribus, tends to increase
welfare. The eﬀect on the training level is ambiguous. With endogenous wages,
we are not able to make robust predictions regarding the eﬀects of this policy
measure.
Taxing training and poaching ﬁrms
In practice, it may be diﬃcult for the government to distinguish between
training and poaching ﬁrms. In this subsection, we therefore analyse the eﬀect of
taxes on both, taking the training level and the entry of training ﬁr m sa sg i v e n .
Proﬁtt a x
Ap r o ﬁt tax on training ﬁr m sd o e sn o ti n ﬂuence their wage setting for expe-
rienced workers. Thus, a proﬁt tax on both training and poaching ﬁrms has the
same eﬀect on turnover as a proﬁt tax on poaching ﬁrms only.
To see this, note that the proﬁt ﬂow of a training ﬁrm is given by (1−t)(ye−
we), and it follows from (3) that
(r + s)J
e =( 1− t)
ye − we
r + s + eepe.
Firms choose we so as to maximise Je, and it follows that the tax does not
inﬂuence the wage that the training ﬁrm sets.
Pay-roll tax
Compared to the situation in which only poaching ﬁrms are taxed, pay-roll
taxes on both training and poaching ﬁrms reduces the eﬀect dramatically. In
22the appendix we show that for ee exogenous and zero on-the-job search costs
(or alternatively, deductible search costs), a pay-roll tax on both training and
poaching ﬁrms has no eﬀect on worker turnover. The reason is that such a tax
does not inﬂuence any of the trade-oﬀst h a te i t h e rp o a c h i n gﬁrms, or training
ﬁrms, or workers face. Free entry ensures that the tax burden is borne by the
workers, and the wage costs including the pay-roll tax remain unchanged.
With endogenous ee, the model becomes more complicated. As the gain from
on-the-job search is reduced by a factor 1/(1+t), the on-the-job search intensity
falls, thus reducing turnover.
In our framework, the aforementioned training policy in France and U.K. is
similar to pay-roll taxes and training subsidies in our framework. For a given level
of ee and h, a pay-roll tax does not aﬀect turnover. Taxes, however, decreases
the joint private value of a match in a training ﬁrm Y n for a given h.T h e ya l s o
imply that the joint private value of h is lower than its social value (provided
that higher values of h imply higher wages and hence taxes). Accordingly, entry
of training ﬁrms and/or the level of h would have to be subsidised. The best
such a subsidizing policy can achieve is to bring welfare back to the level that
welfare reaches in the absence of taxes and subsidies (as the latter is constrained
eﬃcient). With endogenous ee, a pay-roll tax in combination with a training
subsidy may improve welfare (for a given wage), as turnover is reduced.
Assessment of combined policy measures
We have argued that it is possible to obtain the ﬁr s tb e s tr e s o u r c ea l l o c a t i o n
by a (rather complex) mixture of taxes and subsidies. If the authorities cannot
discriminate between training ﬁrms and poaching ﬁrms, a tax on ﬁrm proﬁts is
still eﬀective in reducing turnover. Pay-roll taxes are less eﬀective, even though
they reduce the on-the-job search intensity. These ﬁndings support the result in
Stevens (2001) that training subsidies should be coupled with taxes on proﬁts
and not with pay-roll taxes.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some important features and assumptions in our model,
with particular focus on the matching technology and the wage determination
process. We also contrast our eﬃciency results with the existing ﬁndings in the
literature on general human capital investments, most notably Acemoglu (1997).
Before we do that, we like to point out that our paper is also a contribution
to the literature on the broader issue of search and eﬃciency. In this literature,
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) is closest related to this paper. They study the
ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in physical capital within a search context. Our model
diﬀers from theirs, most importantly in this context is which side of the market
that undertakes the investment. In Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b), the agents
23that invest also advertise the wages, while in our model the agents at the other side
of the market invests. Furthermore, in our model a third party (the incumbent
ﬁrm) may inﬂuence the search process through the wage it sets for searching
workers.
Also related, is the literature on eﬃcient investments in a matching context
without search frictions (e.g., Cole et al. (2001)). Cole et al. (2001) ﬁnd that
even when the parties cannot contract with each other before the investment is
undertaken, an equilibrium with eﬃcient investments can be sustained. They do,
however, abstract from the workers’ search behaviour, from ﬁrm entry and from
turnover, which are all key in our analysis.
Finally, there exists a literature that relates training and asymmetric informa-
tion. Asymmetric information tends to reduce turnover.9 If the current employer
has superior information concerning a worker’s productivity, this may reduce
the amount of turnover and thereby also the ineﬃciency that may be created
by excessive turnover. On the other hand, asymmetric information may create
ineﬃciencies along other dimensions.
5.1 Wage bargaining under the Hosios condition
In this subsection we study to what extent our results remain valid when agents
search in separate markets but wages are determined by wage bargaining. We
assume internal eﬃciency.
With wage bargaining, the search market is generally ineﬃcient even with
homogeneous workers, due to search externalities. The equilibrium outcome is
eﬃcient only if the sharing rule is such that the Hosios condition is met (Hosios
1990). The Hosios condition is satisﬁed whenever the absolute value of the elas-
ticity of q (the arrival rate of workers to ﬁrms with a vacancy) with respect to
the labour market tightness θ is equal to the worker’s bargaining power (share
of bargaining surplus), and when the parties’ outside option in the bargaining
is their ”asset value” (expected net present value of future income) prior to the
match. Thus, the Hosios condition implies eﬃcient on-the-job search markets if
the worker’s outside option in the wage bargaining with the poaching ﬁrm is his
current employment in the training ﬁrm.
In the search and matching literature, it is commonly assumed that the outside
option for the worker is unemployment rather than his previous employment (see
for instance Pissarides (1994)). The rationale for this assumption is that wages
are frequently renegotiated. With this assumption, wages in poaching ﬁrms under
the Hosios are too low compared to the level necessary to achieve the ﬁrst best
outcome. As wages in poaching ﬁrms are too low, too many poaching ﬁrms enter,
and We is below its maximum. Welfare certainly falls, and our conjecture is that
9For references, see Greenwald (1986) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and the refererences
therein.
24both the number of training ﬁrms and the training level in each training ﬁrm
fall. If wages are set ex post,w ec o n j e c t u r et h a tw a g eb argaining may exacerbate
the ineﬃciencies created by increased turnover (although this depends on the
relationship between pe and we).
If the relevant disagreement point for a worker bargaining with a poaching
ﬁrm is to remain in the training ﬁrm, our conjecture is that the Hosios condition
ensures an eﬃcient allocation, as long as internal eﬃciency holds. The Hosios
condition ensures that the negative search externality for agents at the same
side and the positive search externalities for agents at the opposite side of the
market exactly balance in all submarkets. Wages and labour market tightness
are the same as in a competitive search market in all on-the-job search markets
(for all training levels). Hence, the expected income for a trained worker and
thus the incentives to invest are the same as in a competitive search equilibrium
model. The eﬃcient outcome of the on-the-job search markets implies that the
unemployment search market is also eﬃcient (given that the Hosios condition
holds).
Acemoglu (1997) also considers investments in on-the-job training in a setting
with enforceable long-term contracts and bargaining. In his model, turnover is
a result of an exogenous job destruction process after which the worker becomes
unemployed and starts searching for a new job. Acemoglu identiﬁes a positive
externality from training on future employers, and as a result there is underinvest-
ment in training. Within his model, we conjecture that eﬃciency can be obtained
if one allows for separated search markets combined with wage advertisements or
bargaining under the Hosios condition.
5.2 Matching technology
Crucial for our eﬃciency result (Proposition 1) is the assumption that work-
ers with diﬀerent characteristics search in diﬀerent submarkets. If workers with
diﬀerent characteristics were searching in the same submarket, eﬃciency would
no longer prevail. Suppose a subset of workers improve their training. As long
as wages increase less than their productivity, more vacancies enter this mar-
ket. If the search markets are not separated, this beneﬁts all workers in the
market. Thus, there exists a positive externality from training (the ﬁrms, by
deﬁnition, earns zero proﬁt in any case), and underinvestment in training results
(see Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) for a similar result with physical investments
by ﬁrms).
The critical issue is therefore to what extent our assumption that diﬀerent
worker types search in separated search markets is plausible. To be clear, we do
not necessarily argue that complete market separation is the most accurate de-
scription of the real world. Still we believe that this is an interesting benchmark,
as is the complete-market competitive model without search frictions. Further-
more, there are compelling reasons that market separation takes place at least
25to some extent. As discussed in section 2, workers are separated into submarkets
if, in addition to wages, ﬁrms advertise the human capital level required for the
job. We have also noticed that a market maker ﬁnds it optimal to separate the
market into submarkets. Furthermore, a somewhat counter intuitive implication
of a non-separated search market is that workers with diﬀerent productivities
have the same probability of ﬁnding a job in a poaching ﬁrm.
In a setting where ﬁrms invest in physical capital, Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999b) argue that even if ﬁrms cannot advertise wages, workers have an incentive
to direct their search towards ﬁrms with high investments, as they anticipate that
the bargaining outcome in such a ﬁrm will be attractive. Thus, even if wages
are determine by wage bargaining, the market may endogenously separate into
submarkets. This mechanism seems less realistic in our setting with investments
in human capital. Firms usually hire a large number of workers, and it is therefore
more plausible to assume that workers know the capital level in ﬁrms rather than
the other way around.
The discussion concerning separated search markets points at a weakness of
the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search framework, namely the exogenity of
the matching process. It would therefore be of interest to analyse the training
decision in a framework in which the matching process is explicitly modelled. A
natural starting point is the urn-ball process (Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991),
Burdett, et al. (2001)). In this matching process, each ﬁrm posts one vacancy,
and workers choose to which ﬁrm to apply, using mixed strategies. If a ﬁrm ob-
tains more than one applicant, it selects one randomly. Moen (1999) analyses the
workers’ incentives to invest in education before entering the labour market. He
ﬁnds that workers may over-invest in education in order to speed up their job-
ﬁnding process. Because Moen assumes wage bargaining, his over-investment re-
sult is not directly comparable to the results in this paper. His analysis, however,
shows that within the urn-ball matching framework, low productivity workers do
not create congestion eﬀects (search externalities) for high productivity workers.
The reason is that if two workers with diﬀerent productivities apply for the same
job, the most productive worker is always hired in equilibrium (provided that the
wage diﬀerential is smaller than the productivity diﬀerential). This strongly con-
trasts with the properties of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides matching tech-
nology, which implies that an inﬂow of low productivity workers into the market
reduces the contact rate between high productivity workers and ﬁrms. This leads
us to conjecture that within the urn-ball matching framework, a suﬃcient con-
dition for an optimal training decision is that ﬁrms are able to advertise wages
contingent on worker productivity.
5.3 Production technology
Throughout the paper we assume that there are two types of ﬁrms, poaching and
training ﬁrms and that trained worker are more productive in poaching ﬁrms
26than in training ﬁrms. As ﬁrms operate at diﬀerent scales in diﬀerent parts of
t h ev a l u ec h a i no ri nd i ﬀerent product markets it seems likely that they have
diﬀerent comparative advantages: some ﬁrms are in a better position to train
workers than others. The coexistence of diﬀerent types of ﬁrms then implies that
the other ﬁr m sm u s th a v ea d v a n t a g e sa sw e l l .I no u rt w o - d i m e n s i o n a lc a s et h i s
means that they must be more eﬃcient in utilising trained labour.
Our analysis is also applicable if trained workers were equally productive in
training and poaching ﬁrms. With internal eﬃciency there would be no turnover
in equilibrium. This would also be the eﬃcient solution, as turnover has no social
value. With ex post wage setting, the analysis presented here would be directly
applicable. There would be turnover in equilibrium, implying a waste of resources
from a social point of view.
As each ﬁrm hires at most one worker, it may be natural to interpret a ﬁrm
as a job and ﬁrms as consisting of many jobs. An alternative interpretation of
the model would then be that all ﬁrms have access to the same production tech-
nology, and faces the choice of hiring a trained or an untrained worker, i.e., of
opening a poaching vacancy or a training vacancy. We then require an alterna-
tive explanations as to why workers in ”poaching jobs” are more eﬃcient than
workers in ”training jobs”. One explanation may be that an experienced worker’s
productivity also depends on a worker-ﬁrm speciﬁc component which is unknown
at the time of the training decision (or, equivalently, that an experienced worker’s
disutility from working diﬀers across ﬁrms, for instance, due to locational issues).
On-the-job searching workers would then be workers who made a bad ”draw” and
thus have a low worker-ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity component. In expected terms,
t h e s ew o r k e r sw o u l db em o r ep r o d u c t i v ei no t h e rﬁrms. With this interpreta-
tion, our analysis also answers the question as to whether ﬁrms have suﬃcient
incentives to train their workers themselves rather than to poach already trained
workers from other ﬁrms. We answer this question in the aﬃrmative, given that
training ﬁrms operate internally eﬃcient.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyses the incentives to invest in general training in a matching
model with endogenous worker turnover and with wages being set in a competi-
tive fashion. As long as employers and employees are able to resolve within-ﬁrm
co-ordination problems (internal eﬃciency), search frictions do not induce in-
eﬃciencies and the resulting resource allocation is optimal. In the absence of
internal eﬃciency, there may be underinvestment in training as a result of ex-
cessive turnover. As the excessive turnover reduces both the private and the
social return from training, the level of investment in training is, however, still
constrained eﬃcient. A training subsidy alone therefore reduces welfare. In com-
bination with additional policy measures aimed at reducing turnover, a subsidy
27may increase welfare.
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose Lemma 1 does not hold. Then there exists a triple (Wp0,p e0,e e0)s u c ht h a t
We(Wp0,p e0,e e0) >W e∗ and V p(Wp0,p e0) ≥ Kp. By continuity of the problem,
there exists another triple (Wp00,p e00,e e00)s u c ht h a tWe(Wp00,p e00,e e00) >W e∗ and
V p(Wp00,p e00) >K p. This implies that the proﬁt maximisation condition is not
satisﬁed, violating an equilibrium condition.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We use optimal control theory to solve the problem. The associated current-value



















where λ is the associated adjunct function. First order conditions for the maxi-
mum are as follows
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e). (15)
In steady state, condition 2 implies that








p − λ) − c(e
e). (16)
The comparison of (9) and (16) shows that the expressions for λ and We are
equivalent. Furthermore, as the maximisation problem (15) is equivalent to max-
imising λ in (16), the planner maximises We, as in the competitive search equi-
librium. This proves part a). Moreover, as dR
dNe = λ, the social value of a worker
entering the market is equal to We, proving part b).
To prove part c), suppose that the number of poaching ﬁr m si se x o g e n e o u s l y
given. Consider the associated (steady state) competitive search equilibrium,
and denote by V 0 the equilibrium value of a poaching vacancy. Compare this
28equilibrium with the equilibrium of a model in which poaching ﬁrms may enter
at an entry cost V 0. By construction, the equilibrium without entry is also an
equilibrium with entry. Furthermore, as the equilibrium of the model is unique
it follows that the two equilibria coincide. Hence, the asset value of a searching
worker We with and without entry must also coincide.
We now want to show that the social value of a searching worker in the
economy is the same with and without entry by ﬁrms. Let j0 denote the associated
number of jobs in the steady state equilibrium (which is initially equal to the
exogenous number of jobs without entry) and write the aggregate discounted
income net of entry- and search costs (welfare) as a function G(N,j0), where N
is the number of searching workers in the economy. Without entry, the shadow
price of a worker in this economy is gn = ∂G
∂N. With entry, the corresponding




dN. Since the last term is zero due to the envelope theorem
gn = ge and gn = ge = We. This completes the proof of part c).
C. Proof of existence of equilibria
Assume that yp−ye > (r+s)Kp and that
(r+s)(yn−ah∗)+γye(h∗)
r+s+γ > (r+s)Kt.A sr e -
gards the on-the-job search market, we have to show that maximising Y e(Wp,p e)
implies pe > 0g i v e nt h a t( Wp,p e) ∈ Φp. The maximisation problem is inde-
pendent of the measure of workers working in training ﬁrms (provided that it
is strictly positive). Suppose ﬁrst that the optimal solution requires pe =0 . I t
follows that Y e = ye/(r + s). Consider next the pair (ye/(r + s)+ε,ε)w h e r e
ε > 0 is arbitrarily close to zero. Obviously, this yields a higher value of Y e.W e
have to show that (ye/(r + s)+ε,ε) ∈ Φp. We know that limpe→0 q(pe)=∞.







which is by assumption greater than Kp. It thus follows that if there is a posi-
tive measure of workers working in training ﬁrms, there is a positive measure of
poaching ﬁrms entering the market.
Consider now the unemployed search market. We show by contradiction that
pu = 0 cannot be a solution to maximising Wu(Wn,p u)g i v e nt h a t( Wn,p u) ∈ Φt.
Suppose that pu = 0 which implies that Wu = 0. Consider the pair (ε,ε)w h e r e





We know that Y n ≥ Y n(h∗,p e =0 )=
(r+s)(yn−ah∗)+γye(h∗)
(r+s)(r+s+γ) .H e n c e( ε,ε) ∈ Φt for
suﬃciently small values of ε,g i v e nt h a t
(r+s)(yn−ah∗)+γye(h∗)
(r+s)(r+s+γ) > (r + s)Kt.T h u s ,
pu = 0 is inconsistent with equilibrium.
29D .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Denote the number of unemployed workers by N0, the number of novice workers
by N1, the number of experienced workers in training ﬁrms by N2,a n dt h en u m b e r
of workers in poaching ﬁrms by N3.W e n o r m a l i z e N0 + N1 + N2 to one. The
planner’s objective function is then given by























w h i c hh a st ob em a x i m i s e dw i t hr e s p e c tt oh,eu,e e,p u and pe subject to the
following constraints:
˙ N0 = s − (e
up
u + s)N0,
˙ N1 = e
up
uN0 − (γ + s)N1,
˙ N2 = γN1 − (e
ep
e + s)N2,
˙ N3 = e
ep
eN2 − sN3,
We ﬁrst derive the solution for a given h. The associated current-value Hamilto-
































The ﬁrst order conditions for maximium are:
1. The Hamiltonian is maximised with respect to eu,e e,p u and pe.
2. For all i, rλi = ∂H
∂Ni (assuming that we are in steady state).




















30From condition 2 it follows that
(r + s)λ0 = e
up






(r + s)λ1 = y
n − ah + γ(λ2 − λ1), (20)
(r + s)λ2 = y
e + e
ep






(r + s)λ3 = y
p.( 2 2 )
We now compare the optimal solution with the market solution. With internal
eﬃciency and for a given value of h, the expressions for λ0-λ3 are identical to
the corresponding expressions for Wu, Y n ,Y e,a n dY p. Furthermore, (17) and
(18) imply that (pu,e u) maximises λ0,a n dt h a t( pe,e e) maximises λ2,j u s ta st h e
competitive search equilibrium maximises Wu and Y e.T h u s ,f o r a g i v e n v a l u e
of h the equilibrium and the planner’s solution coincide, proving part b).
We know from optimal control theory that the adjoint variables are equal to
the marginal value of the associated state variables. The planner therefore chooses
h so as to maximise the value of an additional worker entering the market. That
is, he chooses h so as to maximise λ0. From (19) it follows that this is equivalent
to maximising λ1.S i n c eh is set so as to maximise Y n in equilibrium, the planner
and the agents in the market solve the same maximisation problem, and the
equilibrium value of h is socially optimal, proving part a).
The proof of part c is analogous to the proof of Lemma 2 part c. Suppose the
number of poaching ﬁrms is given exogeneously, and consider the corresponding
equilibrium. Suppose the asset value of a poaching vacancy in this equilibrium
is V 0. Then consider the equilibrium that emerges with free entry of ﬁrms and
a cost of creating poaching vacancies equal to V 0. We know from the proof of
Lemma 2 that this equilibrium will be identical to the equilibrium without entry
of poaching ﬁrms (as all the asset values and thus also the investments in training
will be the same). We want to show that the social value of training is the same
in the two equilibria as well. Suppose a small subset of worker-ﬁrm pairs deviate
and increase their investments in training. The optimal response with free entry
will then be to increase the number of poaching ﬁr m sa sw e l l .H o w e v e r ,d u et ot h e
envelope theorem the eﬀect of the latter is of second order. Thus, the marginal
social value of level of training is the same in the two equilibria. Thus, since the
training level is optimal in the equilibrium with entry it follows that this will also
be the case in the equilibrium without entry. The same argument holds for entry
of training ﬁrms.
31E. Proof of Lemma 3
Part (1a): Using equation (8), free entry by poaching ﬁr m si m p l i e st h a tWp =
Y p −
r+qe















The above equation implies that the equilibrium value pe∗ maximises pe(Y p −
r+qe
qe Kp − We(we)) ≡ f(We(we),p e) and that the cross derivative fpe,We < 0.
As the second-order conditions for the maximum are always satisﬁed locally,
dpe∗
dWe < 0. From the envelope theorem it follows that
dWe(we)
dwe =1 /(r+s+eepe) > 0.
Thus, pe∗ decreases in we.
Part (1b): We know that pe maximises We, and from equation (23) that pe
therefore maximises pe(Y p −
r+qe


































From the envelope theorem it follows that the derivative of the right hand side
with respect to we is equal to −pe ∂We





Part (2): Using equation (7), free entry by training ﬁr m si m p l i e st h a tWn =
Y n −
r+qu












is maximised with respect to eu,a n dpu. The above equation implies that the
equilibrium value pu maximises pu(Y n −
r+qu
qu Kt − Wu) ≡ f(Y n,p u), and that
the cross derivative fpu,Y n > 0. As the second-order conditions for the maximum
are always satisﬁed locally,
dpu
dY n > 0. Since, Y n is strictly less with ex post wage
setting than with internal eﬃciency fewer training ﬁrms are created.
F .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We ﬁrst show that the social and the private value of an additional experienced
worker entering the market coincide, given the workers’ search behaviour and
entry decisions of ﬁrms in the on-the-job search market.
32The joint private value an experienced worker in a training ﬁrm is given by
Y e =
ye−we
r+s+eepe +We(we), where the ﬁrst term denotes proﬁts and the second the
expected discounted income to workers. From Lemma 2 it follows that the social
value of an experienced worker with productivity we in the training ﬁrm and yp
in a poaching ﬁrm is equal to We(we). When the productivity exceeds the wage
the diﬀerence (ye − we) is allocated to the ﬁrm. The social value of one more
experienced worker is thus
ye−we
r+s+eepe + We(we)=Y e(we). That is, the social and
the private value coincide.
In each submarket, the equilibrium solves (10). Because a training subsidy
does not inﬂuence this maximisation problem, the equilibrium values of we and
pe are independent of the training subsidy.
It follows that at the stage at which human capital investments are made, the
social and the private returns from training coincide. As the training ﬁrms behave
by assumption internally eﬃcient at this stage, it follows that the training levels
undertaken by the agents are equal to the investment levels undertaken by the
planner, i.e., the equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient. Finally, this implies that the
social value of hiring an inexperienced worker coincides with the private value.
Thus, the unemployed search market is eﬃcient as well, and the optimal number
of training ﬁrms enter the market. As the market is constrained eﬃcient at the
stage where the entry decision of training ﬁrms and their investment decision in
training are undertaken, a training subsidy reduces the allocative eﬃciency of the
economy.
G. Proofs of eﬀects of policy measures
i) Entry tax
We ﬁrst show that pe and ee are decreasing in T. Substituting Wp = Y p −
r+qe










p + T) − W
e) − c(e
e). (24)
Let f(pe,T)ee ≡ (r + s)dWe
dpe .F o ra n yT,t h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fpe is thus given by


















The function f(pe,T) only depends on ee through We.S i n c e ee is chosen op-
timally the envelope theorem implies that ∂We/∂ee = 0 around the equilib-
rium point. Accordingly we can analyse changes in pe independently of ee.I t

















Thus, ee increases with T if and only if peA(pe,T) increases with T. It follows





r+s+eepe < 0. At
t h es a m et i m e ,dWe
dT < 0 if and only if peA(pe,T) is strictly decreasing in T (the
envelope theorem implies, again, that we can ignore the eﬀects of ee on We).
Thus, ee is strictly decreasing in T.
We now show that ee(T0) >e e∗ if pe(T0)=pe∗. Suppose that pe is at its
ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e lpe∗,a tat a xT0.L e te A and e B denote the values of A and B that
emerges in the (ﬁrst-best) equilibrium with internal eﬃciency (and no taxes), in
which case pe = pe∗ and ee = ee∗.B yd e ﬁnition, A(pe∗,T0) − B(pe∗,T0)=0a n d
since B(pe∗,T0) > e B, it follows that A(pe∗,T0) > e A.B u t f r o m t h e ﬁrst order
condition for ee it then follows that ee(T0) >e e∗.
Pay-roll tax
Substituting (1 + t)Wp = Y p −
r+qe













Let f(pe,t)ee ≡ (r + s)(1 + t)dWe
dpe . For any t,t h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fpe is given by



















An increase in t reduces A(pe,t) but has no eﬀect on B(pe)f o rag i v e npe.S i n c e
Ape < 0 it thus follows from equation (28) that pe decreases with t.
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and by using the same argument as in that subsection we ﬁnd that ee is strictly
decreasing in t.
To prove that the eﬀect on ee is stronger than that on pe, suppose t0 is such
that pe(t0)=pe∗,w h e r epe∗ denote the ﬁrst best value of pe.D e ﬁne e A and e B as
in the subsection above (entry tax). It follows that B(pe∗)= e B and hence from








Since ee∗ by deﬁnition is given by c0(ee∗)=pe(t0) e A, it follows that c0(ee(t0)) <
c0(ee∗) and hence that ee(t0) <e e∗.
Pay-roll tax on both training ﬁrms and poaching ﬁrms.
Let we denote the wage net of the pay-roll tax. We want to show that the
training ﬁrms set the wage in such a manner that their wage costs including
taxes, e we = we(1 + t), is ﬁxed and independent of the tax rate as is pe.S u p p o s e
t h ew a g ec o s t sa r ei n d e p e n d e n to ft a x e s .I nt h i sc a s eWet = We0/(1 − t), where
Wet and We0 are the expected income to experienced workers with and without
taxes. Free entry by poaching ﬁrms implies that Wpt = Y p −tW pt −
r+qe
qe Kp.I t













or that Wet = We0
1+t for any pe. Since competitive search equilibrium maximises
Wet, it follows that pe is independent of the tax rate. Thus, given that the
training ﬁrms set wages such that the wage cost is unaﬀected by taxes, pay-roll




ye − e we
r + s + pe.
We have just shown that for any e we, pe is independent of t. Thus, the trade-
oﬀ between wage costs e we and the workers’ quit-rate that training ﬁrms face
is independent of t. Hence, for a given h, e we is independent of t.S i n c e , pe
is independent of t, the free entry condition implies that so is e wp.G i v e n o u r
assumptions regarding ee and c(ee), it thus follows that, a pay-roll tax on both
training and poaching ﬁrms has no eﬀect on turnover, for a given h.
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Figure 1. Worker ﬂows in the economy.
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